Problem definition: Energy efficiency programs and demand response programs, two popular approaches to energy demand management, are typically designed and evaluated independently.
Introduction
Energy efficiency (EE) programs and demand response (DR) programs are designed to modify patterns of electrical load, including the timing and level of electricity demand (Energy Information Administration 2017). Modifying load patterns can lessen the strain on the electricity grid, improve grid reliability, and reduce overall power generation costs. EE and DR programs typically are designed and implemented independently, despite their joint effect on load patterns. Without understanding the interactions between these programs, efforts to promote and implement them may fail to achieve desired outcomes. In this paper, we examine the potential conflicts between EE and DR programs, revisit the "energy efficiency gap" in conjunction with DR participation, and show the benefit of jointly designing policies that promote EE and DR.
EE is a way of using less energy to provide the same service, e.g., using more efficient bulbs to provide the same amount of light or upgrading an alloy smelter's furnaces to reduce the electricity consumption per ton of alloy produced. EE benefits society by decreasing demand for electricity, thereby reducing the environmental externalities of electricity generation. EE has received attention since the 1970's, with focus upon establishing EE standards and providing financial incentives for EE improvements. Readers are referred to the Alliance to Save Energy (2013) for a review of the history of EE.
For a variety of reasons, firms install less EE than what would be economically optimal for themselves. This is referred to as the "energy paradox" (Gerarden et al. 2015) . The causes of the energy paradox vary from firm to firm and may include principal-agent problems, lack of information about EE benefits, high discounting of future cash flows, and behavioral biases. However, even if the energy paradox is resolved, firms may still install less EE than what would be considered socially desirable, because firms do not typically pay for the environmental externalities of electricity generation (Jaffe and Stavins 1994, Gerarden et al. 2015) . The difference between the socially desirable level of EE investment and the level chosen by the firm is referred to as the EE gap. In recent years, enormous incentives have been created for EE investments, in part to close the EE Conference in Paris, the U.S. government rolled out the "largest energy-saving standard in history," targeting commercial air conditioners and furnaces (Mooney 2015) . We further the literature in this area by analyzing the impact of DR on the EE gap.
DR programs also modify electrical load patterns. The most expensive electricity to supply is baseline. Jewell (2014) simulates a residential DR program and finds that improved house thermal insulation reduces the home energy use and the effectiveness of the DR program, whereas improving the air conditioning efficiency may increase or decrease the effectiveness of the DR program. Hledik et al. (2016) describe the conflict between EE and DR in the case of electric resistance water heaters, which were to be phased out under the 2010 energy efficiency standard set by the U.S. Department of Energy. However, considering the fact that many electric resistance water heaters can be used as DR resources, the Energy Efficiency Improvement Act of 2015 made an exception for some electric resistance water heaters that are grid-enabled to provide DR. The above papers do not consider program design. In general, the relationship between the two important demand-side management approaches and their joint design warrant more research attention.
We explore the interactions between incentive-based DR programs and EE investments at industrial facilities. Compared to households, industrial firms have higher energy costs as a percentage of total costs. For manufacturing industries, the cost of energy as a percentage of total production cost often exceeds 10% in many basic materials industries and reaches almost 40% in cement manufacturing (Natural Resources Canada 2006) . As such, industrial firms tend to provide the necessary effort to optimize EE investments and DR participation, as our cost-minimization model captures. Specifically, we ask the following questions:
First, for a firm that has to meet a production target, what is the optimal DR strategy, balancing the financial incentives of DR and the costs of rescheduling production? This question addresses the fundamental tradeoff between the costs and benefits of DR. Answering this question helps us to analyze the firm's EE investment in the next question.
Second, how much EE should be installed at a DR-participating firm to minimize the firm's costs? If, instead, we were to minimize the firm's impact on societal costs, how much EE should be installed? These two related questions revisit the EE gap at the firm. The firm would choose an EE investment level that minimizes its own costs, but society may desire the firm to choose a higher EE investment level when environmental externalities are considered. Participation in DR affects the EE investment decision, thus affecting the EE gap. A priori, it is not clear whether the EE gap will grow or shrink when considered jointly with DR.
Third, how can EE and DR programs be jointly designed to increase total societal benefits?
Our formal analysis of the interactions between EE and DR provides a foundation for coordinating the design of EE and DR programs. Specifically, we consider the problem of jointly determining the DR incentive rate and either the EE investment subsidy or the ecological tax on electricity use.
We briefly summarize the insights and policy implications of our paper as follows: 1) EE improvements at the firm may increase or decrease its DR participation, depending on how much the improvement saves in labor costs. Under most circumstances, a higher DR incentive discourages investment in upfront EE improvements. Therefore, the EE gap measured at a DRparticipating firm increases in the DR incentive. Interestingly, the EE gap may be smaller than if the DR program is absent, because the presence of DR reduces the EE investment level required to minimize the firm's impact on society.
2) The EE gap can be closed or reduced with an ecological tax, which augments the retail cost of electricity to incorporate the environmental externalities of electricity generation, or with a subsidy on EE investment costs. However, even if the EE gap is closed, the firm's impact on societal costs is not minimized unless the DR incentive is properly set. Both EE and DR programs contribute significantly to the reduction of the cost on society.
3) To maximize program benefits, EE and DR incentives must be coordinated. We provide theoretical support for jointly determining the EE and DR incentives, in both unconstrained and constrained situations, to achieve a socially desirable outcome.
Literature Review
Many papers have discussed the potential for EE and DR programs to improve cost efficiency and system reliability. With only a few exceptions, however, the papers have examined these two demand-side management programs independently of each other.
The notion of an EE gap and its causes have been discussed for decades. An EE gap is created when EE technologies that would be socially efficient are not adopted. The "energy paradox," which accounts for a portion of the total EE gap, is the apparent reality that some economical EE technologies are not adopted (Gerarden et al. 2015) . Explanations for the energy paradox have been provided by Hirst and Brown (1990), DeCanio (1993) , Jaffe and Stavins (1994) , Gillingham et al. (2009), and Gerarden et al. (2015) . These explanations include principal-agent problems, capital constraints, uncertainty about actual savings, bounded rationality, perceived quality of EE products, lack of management attention, and lack of credible information about returns on investments.
Several papers have discussed ways of resolving the energy paradox for industrial firms. DeCanio (1993) recommends that the government provide informational and organizational services to improve corporate decision making. Sandberg and Söderström (2003) examine the need for decision support to facilitate and improve EE investment decisions. Muthulingam et al. (2013) examine the behavioral aspects of implementing suggestions from energy audits in manufacturing firms. Aflaki et al. (2013) identify factors essential to the effective management of industrial EE projects and provide a framework for finding and implementing EE projects. In a supply chain setting, Nguyen et al. (2018) analyze how EE assessment assistance and buyers' procurement commitment can incentivize suppliers' EE investment. Jaffe and Stavins (1994) and Gerarden et al. (2015) further point out that even if the energy paradox is not present, the EE gap may still exist because there are other reasons why the actual EE investment deviates from the socially desirable level-particularly the environmental externalities that are not fully incorporated into the price of electricity. In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the portion of the EE gap caused by the environmental externalities and how DR programs affect the EE gap.
The benefits of DR programs are manifold, as detailed by Strbac (2008) , Albadi and El-Saadany (2008) , Siano (2014), and O'Connell et al. (2014) . The key benefit of DR comes from the fact that it is often cheaper to forgo consumption during peak times (or shift peak consumption to off-peak times) than to ramp up power generation. By reducing the peak load on the system, grid reliability is improved and grid infrastructure investment can be avoided or deferred.
DR programs can be classified into price-based programs and incentive-based programs (U.S.
Department of Energy 2006)
. Price-based DR programs are based on dynamic pricing of retail electricity. Prices can be preset for defined time blocks (time-of-use pricing, see Kök et al. 2016) or matched to the wholesale market price (real-time pricing, see Lohmann and Rebennack 2017) or lifted only at critical times (critical peak pricing). Incentive-based DR programs reward customers for reducing their load upon request, and can be further categorized into mandatory and voluntary curtailment programs. Mandatory curtailment programs require commitment to a pre-specified load reduction for DR (with penalties for non-compliance), while voluntary curtailment programs allow a firm to choose its level of load reduction every time a DR event is initiated.
In this paper, we focus on incentive-based DR programs with voluntary curtailment. Such programs include not only economic DR programs-for example, the Real-Time Price Response program at NextEra Energy Services (2017) and the PowerShare QuoteOption program at Duke Energy (2017)-but also emergency DR programs, such as the program at the New York Independent Service Operator (ISO) (2016) . Furthermore, our model captures the Demand Bidding programs-for example, the Economic DR program in the PJM Interconnection (2017) and the Day-Ahead DR program at the New York ISO (2016)-in the following way. In our model, the DR incentive rate is random a priori, and the firm's problem involves deciding an optimal DR participation level for every realized incentive rate. Essentially, the firm identifies how much load it is willing to curtail at every price, which forms a load reduction offer curve to be submitted to the ISOs, as required by the Demand Bidding programs. The cleared price and the cleared offer respectively match the realized incentive rate and the DR participation level in our model.
Modeling potential market power and strategic bidding is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our model can be readily modified to cover DR programs with mandatory curtailment, including Interruptible Load, Direct Load Control, and Load as Capacity Resource programs, as discussed in §7 and analyzed in Online Appendix C. The firm's choice between voluntary and mandatory DR contracts is studied by Daniels and Lobel (2014) .
Planning and scheduling production around DR participation is, in itself, an interesting operations management problem. Under a time-of-use price-based DR program, Fernandez et al. (2013) examine the build-up of buffer stock at certain machines to allow the shutdown of other machines during DR without affecting throughput. Under a voluntary, incentive-based DR program, Chao and Chen (2005) consider whether or not to shut down production during DR events, based on the inventory level, the demand process, and the DR incentive. Mohagheghi and Raji (2015) offer an optimization module that verifies whether, and by how much, an industrial plant can curtail its load while meeting production constraints. As a first step toward formally analyzing the interactions between EE and DR, we consider a relatively simpler production system to capture the essential tradeoffs involved in EE investment decisions with the presence of DR.
Initial coordination efforts have been made to increase customers participation in both EE and DR programs. York and Kushler (2005) and Goldman et al. (2010) emphasize that EE and DR programs can be mutually reinforcing from the customers' perspective. For example, the information technologies used to market and monitor DR programs can also be used to help consumers understand their energy use and associated costs, thereby encouraging EE investment. Smith and Managan (2012) suggest a positive feedback loop between the programs, whereby revenue from DR participation funds EE improvements at the firm, which raise awareness of energy use and result in more DR participation. Goldman et al. (2010) explain that coordination between EE and DR can occur via combined program offerings, marketing, and education, via initiatives of private firms, and via building codes and appliance standards. In this paper, we consider a firm that is already engaged in both EE and DR, and we analyze how the DR incentive may affect the firm's EE investment decisions and how the EE investment may affect DR participation.
The literature on the structural interactions between EE and DR is very limited, as noted in §1. King and Delurey (2005) find that EE results in peak load reductions, but cannot be dynamically controlled; DR offers dynamic control but its effect on total consumption is small on average, with notable variations across programs. York and Kushler (2005) and Smith and Managan (2012) discuss potential structural conflicts between EE and DR programs. In incentivebased DR programs, customers are paid for load reductions as measured from a business-as-usual baseline, which can create a perverse incentive to keep the baseline high and not invest in EE.
We complement these papers by examining the societal benefits of jointly designing EE and DR incentives to account for interactions between the two programs.
The joint design of EE and DR programs requires a change in the regulatory policies. Vine (2008) (California ISO 2013) .
Model Setup
In this section, we present a typical industrial setting and describe how EE and DR affect a firm's energy consumption profile and production schedule. Consider a firm manufacturing goods over multiple periods. In each period, the firm must meet a production target before the next period starts. Based on the target, the firm determines a normal production schedule for the period. If the normal production schedule is disrupted, overtime work will be scheduled after the normal schedule (detailed in §3.2). For example, a period may represent one day for a firm that must meet its daily production target. The firm may schedule two eight-hour shifts per day, and overtime work can be scheduled as needed after the second shift. For a firm that schedules 24-hour work for five days a week, a period may represent one week, and overtime work may involve a weekend shift. For the ease of exposition, from this point onward, we consider one period to be one day.
We consider a planning horizon of N periods or days. We assume the production target is the same for all periods, and let T denote the duration, in hours, of the normal production schedule that is adequate to meet the daily production target, e.g., T = 16 hours for two eight-hour shifts.
Let P 0 denote the power, measured in megawatts (MW), needed for normal production. The assumptions of constant production target and constant power are not essential, but facilitate the analysis. Time-varying production targets and/or power consumption will not qualitatively alter the key tradeoffs involved in EE and DR decisions.
Let c, measured in dollars per megawatt-hour (MWh), denote the fixed retail rate of electricity.
Thus, without EE improvement, the firm's electricity cost is cP 0 T per period.
Energy Efficiency (EE)
To reduce its electricity cost while maintaining the same output, the firm may install EE improvements, which require a one-time upfront investment cost and reduce energy use in future periods.
The EE installations reduce the power draw from P 0 to P z def = (1 − z)P 0 , where z ∈ [0, 1) represents the proportion of power saved. We refer to z as the EE improvement level. For analytical convenience, we allow z to be a continuous variable, which is an approximation of the reality in which improvements can be chosen from an EE audit list (Muthulingam et al. 2013) .
Saving power by a proportion of z over N periods requires an upfront investment cost I(z), which satisfies I(0) = 0 and I(z) → ∞ as z → 1. Furthermore, I(z) is increasing and convex in z, because the firm would install inexpensive improvements (e.g., fixing air compressor leaks) before pursuing more expensive improvements (e.g., a new motor).
In our model, the decision of z is made and EE improvements are installed prior to the first period, and the EE savings are realized in periods 1 through N . Investment cost may be paid over time, but for ease of exposition, we assume I(z) is incurred at the beginning of period 1. If any machinery installed during the EE upgrade has a lifetime that is shorter (or longer) than N periods, then a multiple (or a fraction) of the upgrade cost of the machinery will be accounted in
EE investment can also provide productivity benefits, such as reduced maintenance and labor costs, documented by Boyd and Pang (2000) and Worrell et al. (2003) . We can include these benefits during normal work hours as negative cost in I(z), while the potential reduction in the overtime cost will be modeled in the next section.
Demand Response (DR)
During times of peak demand, when society's demand for electricity surges, the firm may be offered an incentive to curtail load. While EE improvement is a long-term decision (z is fixed over the planning horizon), DR participation is a short-term decision that may occur in every period.
At the beginning of every period, the firm is notified whether (and if so, when) a DR event will occur in that period. The duration of the DR event is H hours (H = 0 if no DR event occurs), and the firm is offered an incentive payment of R dollars per MWh of curtailment during the DR event.
Both H and R are random a priori and realized at the beginning of the period, with realizations denoted as h ∈ [0, h max ] and r ∈ [r min , r max ]. The incentive rate R can be predetermined by utilities or adjusted based on the wholesale market price. We assume that the event duration, H, and incentive rate, R, are independent. For analytical convenience, we also assume that H and R vary over time according to a stationary process, and thus we omit time subscripts for H and R.
We also omit the time subscripts for their realization, h and r, because the analysis will be focused on a typical period. Our analysis can be generalized to allow H and R to be correlated and follow a nonstationary process.
In every period, given the realizations of H and R (h and r), the firm decides α ∈ [0, 1], the proportion of the firm's energy reduced during the DR event, i.e., the firm curtails αP z h MWh during the DR event. We refer to α as the firm's DR participation level. Similar to the EE improvement level, z, we assume α is a continuous decision variable. The firm curtails its power consumption during DR events by delaying production. To meet the production target of the period, the firm must ensure that production curtailed during the DR event is made up through overtime in the same period. In practice, industrial users tend to participate in DR by shifting operations. The annual electric power industry survey (EIA 2016) reveals that, in the DR programs surveyed from 2013 to 2015, industry users contributed to over 50% of the peak demand reduction, but only about 8% of energy savings. The costs associated with the production schedule shift can be administrative (rescheduling the work), managerial (ensuring all work is still completed accurately), and compensatory (workers garner overtime pay). These costs typically scale with the amount of work shifted, which can be measured by αh (i.e., portion α of the work is shut down for h hours). Making an EE improvement to upgrade a machine may reduce the amount of labor necessary to operate the machine, which would reduce the overtime labor costs. Let O(x, z) be the aforementioned costs of moving x amount of work to overtime when the EE improvement level is z. Clearly, O(0, z) = 0 and O(x, z) is increasing in x for any given z.
In reality, overtime may also be caused by demand spikes and/or supply shortages. To capture the tradeoff between DR incentive payment and the cost of shifting production, we assume the firm's machinery and workforce are fully reliable. Together with the assumption of a constant production target, this implies that the only reason for overtime is participation in DR events.
For analytical convenience, we assume that I(z) is differentiable and strictly convex in z, and that O(x, z) is twice differentiable in (x, z) and strictly convex in x for any given z, which reflects the reality that the marginal cost of shifting additional production and workers is likely to be higher when more work has already been shifted to overtime. The derivatives are denoted as
Power Generation Cost and Demand Response
Although the firm pays a fixed retail price for electricity, not all megawatts impose the same cost upon society. During times of peak demand, expensive peak power generators must be used to match supply with demand. The marginal generation cost of these peak power generators can be $200 to $300 per MWh, which is much higher than the marginal cost during off-peak hours-typically $30 to $50 per MWh (see an example from EIA 2012). Considering environmental externalities, the variable costs of peak power generation is even higher.
DR offers a demand-side alternative to running peak power generators. The duration of a DR event, defined as H in §3.2, corresponds to the duration when expensive generators are expected to be operating. Many factors, including weather and grid maintenance, influence electricity demand and electric system status. Demand forecasts and electricity day-ahead markets help utilities decide whether to announce a DR event at the beginning of a day.
To capture the essential tradeoffs, we assume that in each period, the marginal cost of power generation has two levels. Let G p and G b denote the marginal cost of power generation during the DR event and outside of the DR event window, respectively. To approximate the true cost of power generation to society, we also include monetized environmental externalities in G p and G b .
Coal-and petroleum-fueled generation can lead to high emissions of CO 2 , SO 2 , NOx, mercury, and particulates, which harm the environment and human health. Natural gas-fired generation produces less emissions. The vintage of the power plants and the equipped emission controls also greatly influence the emission intensities. Older peak power plants without advanced emission controls can still be called upon occasionally (e.g., during extreme heat waves), leading to significantly higher environmental impacts.
Monetizing environmental externalities is challenging and prior research tends to monetize a portion of the damages and give a wide range of estimates; see, e.g., National Research Council (2010) and Epstein et al. (2011) . For our purpose, we focus on the case of G p > G b , i.e., the marginal impact of power generation during DR event is higher than the marginal impact during non-DR time. This is true in many regions such as New England and New York, where petroleum-fueled generators are engaged during DR events and natural gas-fired generators serve as marginal units outside of the DR event windows. In our numerical examples in §5 and §6, we report results based on a set of plausible parameters: G b = $200/MWh and G p = $600/MWh. We have conducted extensive numerical tests for a wide range of parameters and found that the qualitative insights are robust. We also consider the case of G p ≤ G b , which corresponds to the situation when coal-fired generators are the dominant producers while natural gas is used during peak times.
We remark that our model is a firm-level model that reflects the decision process of a typical industrial firm. Based on our conversations with managers at a few large industrial firms, it is reasonable to assume that the frequency and length of DR events, as well as the DR incentive rate, are exogenous to individual firms.
Energy Efficiency Decisions Without Demand Response
A conventional cost and benefit analysis considers EE investment in isolation of DR. This isolated analysis is appropriate for firms that cannot participate in DR. We consider the EE decision that minimizes costs to the firm in §4.1 and the EE decision that minimizes the firm's impact on society in §4.2. We then evaluate the EE gap in §4.3. This analysis provides a benchmark against which we may evaluate the joint EE and DR decisions in §5.
Firm's Cost Minimization
The firm strives to minimize costs over the planning horizon while meeting its production target every period. The key tradeoff here is that an energy efficiency investment requires an upfront cost but decreases ongoing electricity costs. The cost-minimizing firm ignores the environmental externalities of its power consumption unless such externalities are priced into the cost of electricity.
The retail cost of electricity is c per MWh consumed. Under EE improvement level z, the electricity cost to the firm in each period amounts to cP z T . The firm chooses the EE improvement level z by minimizing the sum of the upfront cost of EE improvements, I(z), and the discounted future electricity bills over the planning horizon:
where δ f ∈ (0, 1] is the firm's discount factor per period.
Let z f * be the optimal level of EE improvement for the firm. Because I(z) is convex in z and P z = (1 − z)P 0 by definition, the objective in (1) is convex in z. Thus, if z f * ∈ (0, 1), it satisfies the first-order condition:
where
Minimizing Firm's Impact on Societal Costs
We characterize the EE improvement level at the firm that will minimize the impact of the firm's operations on society, including environmental externalities due to the firm's energy consumption.
As in §4.1, EE improvement level is chosen without DR consideration.
As discussed in §3.3, although the firm pays a fixed retail rate for electricity, the cost of electricity generation varies over time. In the two-level cost model introduced in §3.3, the marginal cost of electricity generation (including environmental externalities) is G p per MWh during H and G b per MWh outside of these hours. Therefore, the EE improvement level, z, should be chosen to minimize the sum of the investment cost and the expected impact of the firm's energy use on society:
where the expectation is taken on H, G p , and G b at the time of EE investment decision, and δ s ∈ (0, 1] is the societal discount factor per period. Note that δ s is often higher than the firm's discount factor, δ f , for two reasons. First, firms generally weigh short-term costs more than longterm costs, whereas society may not significantly discount future costs. Second, society cares about the cost of emissions, which may have long-lived environmental impacts, while the firm only cares about monetary costs. Arguably, the planning horizon should also be longer from the societal point of view. However, a longer planning horizon may involve EE technology changes and multiple investments, which we leave for future research. We focus on one-time EE improvement decision in this paper.
Because G p and G b are independent of H, we can rewrite the problem in (3) as
, andc s is the marginal cost of electricity generation averaged over the firm's operational time T , defined as
Let z s * denote the optimal EE improvement level that minimizes the firm's impact on the societal costs in the absence of DR. The convexity of the objective function in z implies that, if z s * ∈ (0, 1), it satisfies the first-order condition:
Energy Efficiency Gap Without Demand Response
Comparing z f * in (2) and z s * in (6) yields insights into the EE gap, defined as z s * − z f * . The following proposition shows that this gap generally exists under mild conditions. All proofs are in Online Appendix B.
Proposition 1 In the absence of DR, the firm would choose an EE improvement level that is lower than desired by the society (i.e., EE gap z s * − z f * > 0) if the firm's discounted retail cost of electricity is lower than the societal discounted marginal cost of generating electricity, averaged over the firm's operational time (i.e. γ f c < γ scs ).
Thus, society desires more EE than the firm if some combination of the following are true: (a) the full cost of electricity generation to society is not being passed on to the firm through retail electricity costs (c <c s ), and (b) the firm discounts future costs more than society does (δ f < δ s ).
Both inequalities tend to be true in reality. Society experiences a larger cost than the firm because the retail cost of electricity typically does not include a full surcharge for electricity generation's effects on the environment. While the exact form ofc s is specific to our model, the generalization to reality intuitively holds true: society desires more EE installed than the firm if the average marginal generation costs (including environmental externalities) to society are larger than the average price paid for electricity by the firm. The reasons for (b) δ f < δ s were discussed after (3).
Energy Efficiency Decisions Considering Demand Response
We now consider the EE investment problem together with participation in DR events. Because the EE improvement level, z, is decided upfront, whereas the DR participation level, α, depends on the realization of event duration H and incentive rate R, we formulate the problem as a sequential optimization problem.
Firm's Cost Minimization
We first solve for the optimal DR participation level, α, given the EE improvement level, z, the realized length of the DR event, h, and the DR incentive rate, r. We then solve for the optimal upfront EE improvement level, z.
Optimal DR Under Given EE Improvement
In practice, to determine the DR payment to the firm, a business-as-usual baseline power draw is measured by meters and verified by the administrator of the DR program. In our setting, the baseline is the firm's power consumption without DR, i.e., the baseline is P z after EE improvement.
Hence, curtailing α portion of the power during a DR event of h hours, the firm shifts αP z h MWh of energy to the off-peak and receives a payment of rαP z h after the event. In practice, the baseline is calculated based on the consumption over the 5 to 10 most recent non-event workdays (e.g., PJM
Interconnection 2017). Thus, after EE improvements are installed, it takes a brief period of time for the baseline to become P z . For longer planning horizons (e.g. several years), assuming that the baseline is P z after EE improvement will not introduce any long-term inaccuracies.
In each period, the length of the DR event, h, and the incentive rate, r, are announced. The firm then decides the proportion of energy to curtail to minimize its daily operating costs, including the DR payment as a negative cost:
where cP z T is the daily retail cost of electricity and O(αh, z) is the overtime cost defined in §3.2.
If no DR event is called (h = 0), C(z, h, r) collapses to cP z T . For h > 0, the following lemma gives the optimal response of the firm. Recall O 1 (x, z) ≡ ∂O(x, z)/∂x. Treating z as a given parameter,
we define the inverse function of
Lemma 1 Given EE improvement level, z, DR incentive rate, r, and DR event length, h > 0, the firm's optimal DR participation is to reduce power consumption by the proportion
where A(z, r)
is the maximum duration of a DR event (under given z and r) for which the firm will halt the entire production. The minimum cost per period, defined in (7), is
Note that shifting work to overtime results in marginal overtime cost, O 1 (αh, z), and marginal DR benefit, rP z . The firm would not curtail energy if the marginal overtime cost always exceeds
1 (rP z , z) = 0 and thus α f * = 0 for any h.
When O 1 (0, z) < rP z , the optimal DR, α f * , depends on the length of the DR event, h:
• If h ≤ A(z, r) (short DR event), the firm is willing to halt the entire production (i.e., α f * = 1) and reap the maximum DR benefit available.
• If h > A(z, r) (long DR event), overtime costs are so high that it is optimal not to halt the entire production, but shut down a proportion that is equal to A(z, r)/h.
Next, we study the interaction between EE and DR. We first look into the effects of EE decision on DR participation, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The effect of the EE improvement level, z, on the DR participation level, α f * , depends on the overtime cost structure.
(i) If EE improvement does not affect the overtime cost, i.e., O(x, z) = O(x) is independent of z, then the firm's optimal DR participation level, α f * , (weakly) decreases in the EE improvement level, z. In particular,
, then α f * ∈ (0, 1] and weakly decreases in z.
(ii) If EE improvement reduces the overtime cost in such a way that O(x, z) ≡ O(x(1 − z)), then the firm's optimal DR participation level, α f * , (weakly) increases in the EE improvement level, z.
In general, EE improvements affect the firm's DR participation level in two ways. First, EE improvements lower the baseline and, therefore, reduce the payment that the firm receives when curtailing for DR-this effect discourages DR participation. Second, EE investments may reduce the overtime cost (refer to the productivity benefits discussed in §3.1), allowing work to be shifted at a lower cost, which encourages DR participation. The combined effect is that DR participation may increase or decrease in the EE improvement level, as seen in Proposition 2. In Proposition 2(i), only the first effect is present and, therefore, EE improvements reduce DR participation. In part (ii), the overtime cost structure implies that, as EE improvement level z increases, the marginal overtime cost decreases faster than the decrease in the marginal DR payment, and thus the DR participation level increases.
Optimal EE Improvement
To decide the upfront EE investment, the firm aims to minimize the sum of the upfront investment cost and the discounted daily operating costs:
where C(z, H, R) is given in (9) in Lemma 1.
With the knowledge of the minimal cost C(z, h, r) from Lemma 1, we now solve for the optimal EE improvement level, denoted as z f * DR , for the firm. Our numerical analysis has found that, for all realistic parameter combinations we have examined, the objective in (10) is unimodal and the firstorder condition uniquely determines the optimal EE improvement level. Furthermore, employing the supermodularity property, we can analyze the monotonicity property of z f * DR . The monotonicity property does not require uniqueness. In rare situations when the optimal solution is nonunique, the descending notion in Topkis (1978) can be used in lieu of the decreasing notion in Proposition 3.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For the EE investment problem with DR in (10), if the optimal EE improvement level z f * DR is greater than zero, then it satisfies
DR , decreases when the DR incentive rate, R, is shifted or scaled upward. In particular, the EE improvement level in the presence of DR is lower than the EE improvement level in the absence of DR, i.e., z f * DR ≤ z f * .
As shown in (11), the optimal EE improvement, z f * DR , balances the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of EE. The marginal cost of EE includes not only the marginal upfront cost of installation,
benefit from more EE is a marginal reduction in electricity bills, γ f cP 0 T , as well as the reduced (11) to (2), we see that DR alters the original tradeoff by introducing the effect of EE investment on DR-related revenue and cost into the equation for determining the EE investment.
In Proposition 3, the sufficient condition is satisfied in most situations. To see this, consider a special overtime cost function O(x, z) = O(x, 0)(1−z), which means that EE improvement at level z reduces overtime cost by a fraction of z, the same fraction as the energy consumption reduction. In this special case, it can be readily verified that
O 1 (x,z) = 1 1−z , i.e., the sufficient condition holds with equality. In most realistic situations, as a side-benefit of EE improvements, the overtime cost normally would not decrease as fast as energy consumption, which amounts to the inequality O 1 (x,z) represents the proportion of marginal overtime cost savings due to EE improvement. We further remark that even if the above sufficiency condition does not hold, the firm's choice of EE improvement level z typically still decreases when the incentive rate increases for all but the most extreme cases of overtime cost functions. In §5.3, we will examine one overtime function that does not satisfy the sufficiency condition and for which the firm still decreases its EE installations as DR incentives increase. Importantly, Proposition 3 reveals that the firm's opportunity to participate in DR discourages its EE investment, because EE installations inadvertently reduce the firm's DR revenue stream. As a result, one may expect the EE gap to widen with the growth of DR programs, as DR-participating firms reduce investments in EE that will lower their future DR revenue. However, as we will see in the next section, the EE investment that minimizes the firm's impact on societal costs also changes when DR is considered.
Minimizing the Firm's Impact on Societal Costs

Optimal DR Under Given EE Improvement
We now optimize the DR participation level and EE improvement level at the firm from the societal perspective. During a DR event, the firm's curtailment helps reduce the peaking cost of electricity generation. As discussed in §3, we assume that the actions of a single firm have a negligible effect on the duration of the DR event H and the DR incentive rate R.
Let M be the difference in the marginal generation costs between the peak and the off-peak:
Let m, g p , and g b denote the realization of M , G p , and G b in a period. One MWh of energy shifted from the peak to the off-peak saves M for society, which is balanced against the increase in the cost of overtime. The DR incentive payment and retail costs of electricity are transfer payments that are not included in the societal costs. The societal costs also include the inconvenience costs to the workers who work overtime and have to delay or cancel personal activities. The overtime compensation (part of the overtime cost) is an approximation of these inconvenience costs, and thus not a transfer payment.
Similar to §5.1, we consider a sequential optimization problem. Knowing the EE improvement level, z, the DR event duration, h, and the two-level marginal generation costs, g p and g b , the firm's DR participation level, α, is chosen to minimize the sum of overtime cost and the marginal impact of the firm's energy use on society:
In (13), the first two terms represent the marginal generation costs of the firm's energy use without DR participation, O(αh, z) represents the overtime costs, and −mαP z h represents the generation cost reduction due to DR participation.
The following lemma gives the optimal DR desired by society. Lemma 2 Given EE improvement level, z, marginal cost difference, m, and DR event length, h > 0, the firm's DR participation level that is optimal for society is
where B(z, m)
Similar to A(z, r), B(z, m) is the maximum duration of the DR event for which society desires the firm to halt its entire production. The structure of the optimal DR for society is parallel to that for the firm in Lemma 1. The only difference is that the marginal benefit of DR is mP z to society, while it is rP z to the firm.
Analogous to Proposition 2, the effect of EE improvement on the DR participation level depends on the overtime cost structure, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (i) If EE improvement does not affect the overtime cost, i.e., O(x, z) = O(x), then the optimal DR participation level, α s * , (weakly) decreases in the EE improvement level, z.
(ii) If EE improvement reduces the overtime cost in such a way that O(x, z) = O(x(1 − z)), then the optimal DR participation level, α s * , (weakly) increases in the EE improvement level, z.
Propositions 2 and 4 suggest that the dependence of DR participation on the EE improvement is qualitatively the same regardless of whether we are minimizing costs to the firm or to society.
Optimal EE Improvement
Now that the firm's DR curtailment desired by society is known, we next find the EE improvement at the firm desired by society. Parallel to the firm's problem in (10), the EE improvement desired by society is determined by solving min z∈[0,1)
is given in (15) and the expectation is taken on H, G p , and G b .
Proposition 5 For the EE investment problem with DR in (16), if the optimal EE improvement
level z s * DR > 0, then it satisfies
wherec s is the marginal cost of generating electricity averaged over T , as defined in (5). If
, the EE improvement level in the presence of DR is lower than the EE improvement level in the absence of DR, i.e., z s * DR ≤ z s * .
Proposition 5 is the societal analog to Proposition 3. Importantly, Propositions 3 and 5 reveal that the presence of DR reduces the optimal EE investment level, regardless of whether we are minimizing costs to the firm or to society. Thus, the effect of DR on the EE gap deserves further analysis, which we present next.
Energy Efficiency Gap In the Presence of Demand Response
In §4.3, the EE gap in the absence of DR is measured as z s * − z f * . With DR participation, the EE gap, measured as z s * DR − z f * DR , needs to be reassessed. The presence of DR reduces both the firm and societal choices of EE improvement level. The EE improvement level desired by society at the firm, z s * DR in Proposition 5, does not depend on the DR incentive rate, as DR payments are transfer payments. However, the EE improvement level desired by the firm, z f * DR in Proposition 3, decreases in the DR incentive rate. Furthermore, observe that if the DR incentive is very low, the firm would not participate in DR and would decide EE improvements as if the DR program were absent. These observations imply that, somewhat unexpectedly, if the DR incentive is small, the EE gap assessed in conjunction with DR is actually smaller than the EE gap in the absence of DR, since z s * DR ≤ z s * . We formally state this result in Proposition 6 below. For ease of exposition, we let DR incentive R assume a deterministic value r and use z f * DR (r) to emphasize the dependence of the firm's EE decision on r.
Proposition 6 In the presence of DR, the EE gap, z s * DR − z f * DR (r), increases in the DR incentive rate, r. There exists an incentive rate r > 0, such that z s * DR − z f * DR (r) ≤ z s * − z f * if and only if r ≤ r. Figure 2(b) and (c) also illustrate the existence of r in Proposition 6. When r < r, the firm participates in DR less actively and invests more in EE than if r > r. The EE gap when r < r is smaller than the EE gap in the absence of DR, which is smaller than the EE gap when r > r.
For decades, policy makers have attempted to close the EE gap with incentives and regulations.
Such efforts seem to be growing in scope, judging by the recent initiatives mentioned in §1. Our analysis suggests that policy makers should understand the impact of DR on the EE gap to design policies that effectively reduce the EE gap.
Coordinating Energy Efficiency and Demand Response
Upon recognition of the EE gap, policy makers have tried to induce firms to increase their EE investments. A common incentive is to subsidize the cost of EE investments, so that the firm either pays less out of pocket or receives a rebate for investment cost incurred. For illustrative purposes, we consider a simple subsidy policy, under which the government subsidizes a proportion ψ ∈ (0, 1) of the investment so that the firm incurs cost (1 − ψ)I(z).
Another policy that is frequently discussed is an ecological tax that augments the retail cost of electricity to help cover the environmental externalities of energy use. If the retail price of electricity is augmented toĉ > c, the firm has more incentive to reduce the cost of its electricity bill through EE improvements.
While DR has been growing, policy makers rarely design EE and DR policies that complement each other and encourage firms to act in a way desired by society. In this section, we demonstrate the consequences of failing to consider the interactions between EE and DR, and propose ways to coordinate the design of these two demand-side programs. In particular, if the government subsidizes proportion ψ of the EE investment, without considering the effects of DR, the government would anticipate the firm to improve EE to levelẑ(ψ), which satisfies (1 − ψ)I ′ (ẑ(ψ)) = γ f cP 0 T, similar to the condition in (2). Given an augmented retail price of electricityĉ > c, the government would anticipate the firm to improve EE to levelẑ(ĉ), satisfying I ′ (ẑ(ĉ)) = γ fĉ P 0 T . The presence of DR, however, renders bothẑ(ψ) andẑ(ĉ) overestimates of the firm's actual level of EE improvement.
This is similar to z f * ≥ z f * DR in Proposition 3.
Closing the Energy Efficiency Gap
From §5.3, we see that the EE gap increases in DR incentives. Thus, to close the EE gap or reduce it to a certain level, we must consider the effect of DR incentives. Using the same example examined in Figure 2 , we measure the EE gap under both EE and DR incentives, shown in Figure 3 .
Figure 3(a) shows that the EE gap decreases as the investment subsidy increases under various DR incentive rates. The lowest curve represents the EE gap when the firm is not given any incentive to participate in DR. A higher DR incentive rate reduces the firm's incentive to invest in EE, thereby widening the gap. In other words, under a higher DR incentive, a higher investment subsidy is needed to reduce the EE gap to a given level. Similarly, Figure 3 (b) illustrates that a higher DR incentive leads to a wider EE gap, requiring a higher retail cost to reduce the EE gap to a given level. Without recognizing the interaction between EE and DR, both investment subsidies and ecological taxes will fail to achieve their desired EE improvement level. Note that the concavity of Figure 3 (a) is due to the fact that at high ψ, one percent of additional subsidy reduces the firm's remaining investment cost by a higher proportion, leading to a stronger effect in closing the gap. Figure 3(b) , on the other hand, exhibits convexity, because at a high c, an additional dollar levied on energy consumption increases the firm's energy costs by a smaller proportion, leading to a declining effect in closing the gap. The qualitative results in this section are robust with respect to the overtime cost structure. See Online Appendix A for more details.
Reducing Societal Impact via Both EE and DR Incentives
To close the EE gap in the absence of DR, the government can design EE incentives to raise the firm's EE improvement level from z f * to z s * , which minimizes the firm's impact on societal costs; see (4)- (6). However, when the firm also participates in DR, closing the EE gap is an incomplete objective. We will show in this section that, even when the EE gap is closed, the firm's impact on societal costs is not minimized unless a proper DR incentive is provided. Coordinated EE and DR incentives can be significantly more beneficial than policies designed in silos.
To minimize the firm's impact on societal costs, the optimal DR participation and EE improvement levels are characterized in Propositions 4 and 5. Sub-optimal combinations of EE and DR incentives lead to an increase in the costs imposed on society by the firm's operations. Figure 4 shows how this increase in cost on society varies with the EE and DR incentives, using the same parameters as in Figure 3 .
In Figure 4 , first note that when there is no DR incentive (r = 0) and no EE subsidy (ψ = 0) or taxes (ĉ = c = $80/MWh), the firm's operations will impose 12.5% more cost on society than the minimum possible cost on society. Next, we examine the relative effectiveness of EE and DR incentives in reducing the cost on society. When r = 0, by offering EE incentives (increasing ψ orĉ in the region where the cost decreases), the extra cost on society decreases by 8 percentage points (from 12.5% to about 4.5%). For any other given DR incentive rate r, EE incentives can also reduce the cost on society by 7 to 9 percentage points (e.g., for r = $200/MWh, EE incentives can decrease the extra cost from 8% to 0.8%). On the other hand, for any given EE incentive level, by offering DR incentives, the cost on society can be reduced by about 4 to 5 percentage points.
In all cases, the firm's impact on societal costs cannot be minimized by only altering EE incentives or by only altering the DR incentive. Only coordinated EE and DR incentives can minimize the costs imposed on society. In this example, when 12.5% of the cost on society is shaved by using the optimal EE and DR program offerings, the EE program contributes about two-thirds of the cost reduction, while the DR program contributes about one-third. The relative effectiveness of the two programs depends on the DR event duration and the cost parameters G p and G b . Both programs are critical in reducing the impact of firm's operations on society.
The following proposition underscores the importance of coordinating EE and DR incentives and further prescribes a DR incentive rate that aligns the firm's actions with society's desires.
Proposition 7
To minimize the firm's impact on societal costs, both EE improvement level and DR participation level must be aligned to the societal desired levels. The DR incentive should be the positive difference between the peak and off-peak cost of power generation:
If the "energy paradox" does not exist, i.e., discount factors δ s = δ f , then the retail price of electricity should be augmented toc s defined in (5).
To verify Proposition 7 using the previous example, note that G p − G b = $400/MWh and, in Figure 4 , EE incentives under r = $400/MWh can minimize the cost on society. In Figure 4 (b), the optimal augmented cost isĉ = $264.5/MWh, which is greater thanc s = $217.5/MWh, due to the existence of a behavioral gap (δ s > δ f ) in our example.
Recall from the analysis in §5.2 that one MWh of energy shifted from the peak to the off-peak saves M for society. Thus, in Proposition 7, setting DR incentive R = M + passes marginal societal savings to the firm, thereby aligning the firm's DR incentive with the societal incentive.
Proposition 7 provides theoretical guidance on incentivizing the firm to take EE and DR actions desired by society. In practice, however, it may frequently be the case that the optimal level of EE incentive is infeasible for various reasons, e.g., a high subsidy may not be practical in the government budget or the socially-desirable ecological tax is politically unpalatable. In those cases, our model provides a framework to perform a constrained optimization to find the best DR incentive under a given, feasible level of EE incentive. Figure 5 reveals that, although r = G p − G b = $400/MWh is part of the optimal incentive scheme, r = $400/MWh is not necessarily optimal for every EE incentive level. Figure 5 (a) numerically determines the DR incentive that minimizes the firm's impact on societal costs for each EE subsidy fraction. In this example, if the subsidy fraction is constrained by ψ ≤ 0.5, then the best Finally, we comment on the case of G b > G p , where G b and G p may represent the marginal costs, including externalities, of coal-fired and natural gas-fired generators, respectively. Our model is general enough to include this case: Proposition 7 prescribes that the DR incentive should be zero, implying that the firm would not shift its production from peak to off-peak.
Conclusion and Extensions
In this paper, we have studied the incentive conflicts between energy efficiency (EE) and demand response (DR). We have demonstrated that the presence of a DR incentive in future periods will decrease the upfront EE investment. We have revisited the EE gap caused by the environmental externalities of energy generation. This EE gap must be reassessed in the presence of DR, because the opportunity to participate in DR affects both the EE level desired by the firm and the EE level desired by society. We have found that the level of the DR incentive may render the EE gap to be smaller or larger than in the absence of DR.
In the presence of DR, closing the EE gap at the firm may not minimize its impact on society.
Thus, policy makers should not focus on reducing the EE gap alone, but aim to jointly design EE and DR programs to deliver maximum benefit. The framework in this paper provides theoretical guidance and qualitative insights on designing incentives to coordinate EE investments and DR participation.
This paper has several limitations. To make our model tractable and obtain insights into the basic tradeoffs between EE and DR, our analysis uses simplifying assumptions on the electricity generation costs on society. Although our bi-level cost structure does not capture the full spectrum of reality, it approximates the fact that, while cheaper power generators are sufficient to meet most demand, there are times when expensive peak generators are engaged to match demand peaks.
There may be other ways that a firm could gain more flexibility to respond to DR events, such as revising the production target. With more flexibility, we expect the firm to participate more in DR and thus gain a higher DR revenue. Consequently, the firm will have less incentive to invest in EE, which strengthens the results in the paper.
This paper does not model all of the potential benefits of EE and DR. For electricity grid, demand-side management can defer or eliminate the need for infrastructure investment (Vine 2008) .
For a manufacturing firm, EE improvement may shield the firm against regulatory risk. Furthermore, implementation of EE and DR can demonstrate the firm's commitment to the environment-a growing requirement from large retailers (Walmart 2016).
In closing, we consider two extensions to our analysis. The first focuses on using an on-site generator to lower the firm's demand from the grid, instead of shifting production to overtime.
The second considers incentive-based DR programs with mandatory curtailment. Our modeling framework can be readily generalized to these situations, and our main insights continue to hold.
On-Site Generation: Some firms perform DR not by turning off machines and working overtime, but instead by running an on-site generator. The on-site option provides some or all of the electricity needed by the firm, and the firm's demand on the external grid is thereby lessened. This option could be incorporated by altering the "overtime" costs in our model. Instead of O(·) being convex increasing, it would be linear, representing the linearly increasing cost of fueling the on-site generator as more load is switched to the on-site option. We can show that the on-site option will be run in an all-or-nothing way during DR events. Either it is economical for the firm to use the on-site generator to take on as much of the firm's load as possible, or it is not worthwhile to use the on-site option at all, based on the DR incentive. Policy makers are wary of using on-site generation to perform DR. A small-scale, on-site generator may be more polluting than the peak power generators of the grid. As such, regulations often dictate what types of on-site generators may be used during DR events.
DR Programs with Mandatory Curtailment: These programs offer predetermined payments to a firm for committing to reduce consumption by a pre-specified amount in all future DR events.
The firm receives this payment whether or not any events are called and receives an extra incentive payment, akin to R, per MWh curtailed when an event is called. The firm is penalized for not curtailing to their contracted level. The problem setup and notations are similar to the model in the paper. The main difference is that the firm (or society) now simultaneously optimizes the EE improvement level, z, and the DR participation level, α. In Online Appendix C, we show that the insights in the paper continue to hold. Notably, the firm's upfront EE investment decreases in the DR incentive, and the size of the EE gap still depends on the DR incentive.
Appendix: Numerical Settings
The base case considers a typical energy-intensive manufacturing firm that consumes P 0 = 10 MW during T = 16 operating hours. The firm's electricity cost is fixed at c = $80 per MWh or 8 cents per kWh. The firm's daily discount factor is δ f = 0.9996, which is equivalent to 11.3% annual rate of return, assuming 300 working days per year. The planning horizon is 5 years or N = 1500 days.
When minimizing the firm's impact on societal costs, we use a discount factor δ s = 0.9999, which is equivalent to 3.0% annual discount rate. To estimate the environmental externalities of power generation, we refer to the emission factors established by the Environmental Protection Agency. The emissions for three typical power generating units are shown in Table 1 . Note: Compiled using data from EIA (1999 , Table 2 ) and assuming the heat rate for natural gas, oil, and coal-fired units are 7,500, 11,000, 10,500 Btu per kWh, respectively. This table is for illustration of emissions from typical generation units. The vintage of the units and the equipped emission controls greatly influence the emission intensities.
Monetizing environmental externalities is challenging and prior research tends to monetize a portion of the damages and give a wide range of estimates. The National Research Council (2010) estimates that the damage associated with three air pollutants-SO 2 , NOx, and particulates-from coal-fired generation varies from 0.5 to 13 cents per kWh (5th and 95th percentiles, respectively).
For natural gas-fired power plants, this damage is only 0.001 to 0.55 cents per kWh (5th and 95th percentiles, respectively). The National Research Council (2010) also provides estimates of amounts of green-house gas emissions and other pollutants including metals, radionuclides, effluents, and solid wastes occurring during resource extraction, transportation, and power generation, but comments that it is difficult to monetize the damages of these pollutants.
In the base case in this paper, the marginal cost of electricity generation including environmental externalities is G b = $200 per MWh for natural gas-fired generators and G p = $600 per MWh for petroleum-fired generators. We have conducted extensive robustness tests for various combinations of parameters, and found that qualitative insights remain the same.
To reduce the firm's power consumption by a fraction z, we assume the required investment cost is I(z) = 50z 2 1 − z million dollars. Nguyen et al. (2018) assume that energy saving is increasing and concave in the investment level I in a square root form, i.e., I is quadratic in energy savings.
Our investment function I(z) is approximately quadratic at low levels of EE improvement, and we introduce a denominator 1 − z to capture the reality that EE measures cannot eliminate energy use entirely. Our model results in a required investment of approximately $5,000 for the first 1% improvement in EE, $132,000 for 5% EE improvement, $2.5 million for 20%, and so on.
In our model, we assume that the DR event duration has the following discrete distribution: H = 0 with probability 0.8, H = 2, 3, 4, 5 hours with probabilities 0.05. In other words, the expensive peaking generators will be used on averageH = 0.7 hours a day, or 3% of the time, which is a realistic capacity factor for the peakers. ashx). In our numerical setting, we allow the DR incentive to vary between 0 and $600/MWh.
The firm responds to DR by delaying production. Our numerical analysis tests two forms of overtime cost structures:
(a) O(x, z) = 300x 2 , in which EE improvement has no impact on overtime cost, and 
B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Comparing (2) and (6), we see that both the firm and society face the same convex investment cost function, I(·). Thus, z s * > z f * if γ scs > γ f c.
Proof of Lemma 1:
We solve the minimization problem in (7): min
Because the objective function is convex in α, the optimal solution can be determined by the first-order condition and expressed as Substituting the optimal DR into (7), we can verify the minimum cost expressed in (9). We can replace h max in the last equation by A(z, r) ≥ h max because F H (x) = 1 for x ≥ h max .
Proof of Proposition 2:
Hence, (A.2) again holds.
Third, when rP z ≤ O 1 (0, z), we have A(z, r) = 0 and the firm will not participate in DR, and the objective in (A.3) reduces to C f (z) = I(z) + γ f cP z T , which coincides with the objective in
(1) when EE is considered in isolation. The first order derivative is exactly (A.2), noting that
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof is parallel to the proof for Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5: Because I(z) → ∞ as z → 1, z s * DR < 1. Thus, if z s * DR > 0, it must be an interior solution and satisfies the first-order condition. It suffices to prove that the first-order derivative of the objective in (16) (A.13)
Using the techniques of the proof for Proposition 3, we can show that C s′ (z) is exactly (A.11).
Based on the first order conditions for z s * DR (in (6)) and z s * DR (in (17)), we can see that z s * DR ≤ z s * if the following condition holds: (A.14)
Proof of Proposition 7: The firm's problem in (7) and (10) 
When g p − g b > 0, if we set DR incentive r = g p − g b , then the inner minimization problem will be the same for the firm and for the society.
When g p − g b ≤ 0, note that the optimal DR level is clearly α s * = 0. Zero demand response can be induced by not providing any incentive, i.e., r = 0.
Combining the two cases, we see that setting r = (g p − g b ) + aligns DR for any given z. Thus, before G p and G b realize, we can write the DR incentive as R = (G p − G b ) + .
If an investment subsidy is provided or an ecological tax is levied to induce the firm to choose the optimal EE improvement level, z s * DR , then the firm would also be participating in the DR as desired by the society.
When there is no behavioral gap: γ s = γ f , comparing the firm's and societal problems above, we see that EE incentive can be aligned by setting the retail price to bec s defined in 
C. Demand Response Programs with Mandatory Curtailment
In a DR program with mandatory curtailment, the firm pre-commits to a DR participation level for all future DR events. We assume the decision is made simultaneously with the EE investment We assume R and H are independent. While this is a simultaneous optimization over z and α, we may still solve for the optimal α for any z and then optimize over z. Thus, given z, we will seek
